complete separation of communications in respect of secret signals to agents in Western Europe. It is hoped that "C" will agree to this but if he does not, I fear that we shall have to ask you to take it up. I am myself entirely convinced

(a) that we can successfully run such communications by ourselves,

(b) that there would not be the faintest danger to "C"'s security in our doing so, and

(c) that such a divorce would, in practice, greatly improve our relations with "C" in that we should not need constantly to bother him with minor grievances based on complaints that our own interests were being subordinated to his.

With regard to the paragraph on transport, technically we still share a Special Squadron with "C" but, in practice, this is now being divided up into aeroplanes always at "C"'s disposal and others always at ours. Sea transport is a separate problem but progress in co-operation has recently been made, and the N.I.D., who are responsible for such communications are fully conscious of the needs of S.O.E. and of the necessity for extending the existing facilities.

Finally you will observe that the method of financing the "D" organisation was left over for further discussion. It has been found best to continue the system whereby money is handed over by the Treasury to the Foreign Office, who pass it on to us, through "C". But this does not mean that either the Foreign Office or "C" has any control over our expenditure. Such control is exercised by Mr. Herbert Brittain, of the Treasury, who examines every item very carefully with Wing Commander Venner, and consults either Mr. Maley or Sir Horace Wilson when necessary.

I should add that, at the instance of "C" an attempt

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was/-

was made, at the turn of the year, to revise our original agreement so as to bring it up to date, but this attempt was temporarily abandoned pending tht settlement of the outstanding question of communications.

With this background I approach the more personal side of the problem referred to by C.D. in his minute, and as exemplified in the catalogue of grouses which he attaches. With regard to the latter, I can vouch for the facts recorded under the headings "West Africa" and "Communications" being as stated. The rest consists of incidents with which I did not personally deal, since it is C.D's unpleasant duty to try to iron out all such disputes. But I know how many there have been and how exasperated many of the senior officers of S.O.E. have in consequence become.

In any case I think there is a good deal in the general criticism of the attitude of the S.I.S. which C.D. makes in paragraph 4. The suggestion that we are "amateurs" has, of course, been freely made; and in the sense that "subversion" was a comparatively new idea which, as a weapon, had never been wielded by this country before, it contains a certain element of truth. Nevertheless, it was never true that those responsible for S.O.E. work complete amateurs in secret service work. C.D. himself worked for the S.I. S. in Switzerland from the beginning of the war until July 1940. Colonel Taylor worked in the original of the S.I.S. from May 1939 until S.O.E. was formed. Brigadier Gubbins had had long periods of service both in the Military Intelligence and in the special "sabotage" section known as "M.I.R", and Colonel Davies too, had served in M.I.R. I myself could not be said to be entirely ignorant of the S.I.S. machine having been in almost daily contact with it for two and a half years before joining Mr. Dalton. At a later date we were joined by Air Commodore Boyle who was Director of Intelligence at the

Air/-

Air Ministry, and who has a very wide and indeed professional knowledge of secret intelligence work. Several other members of the organisation also served in its ranks as members of the S.I.S. On the whole, therefore, I do not think there are any grounds for saying that we are, or ever have been, as a body, ignorant of the rules of the secret service game, or likely to do anything which would endanger the working of "C"'s machine.

With regard to present relationships I can only say that, so far as I am concerned, they have been excellent both with the C.S.S. and S.C.S.S., the only members of the S.I.S. machine with whom I really come into contact. Nevertheless, I have always had the impression that, whereas we keep nothing from the S.I.S., they keep a very great deal from us. Thus, we are only too delighted if any senior member of the S.I.S. wishes to come to see our War Room where the position of every agent we possess is indicated on maps and where all telegrams received from the agents are kept in special folders. Equally we welcome any interest shown by the S.I.S. in our establishments for the training of agents and wireless operators. These and our technical establishments are open for inspection by any qualified person, whether in the Service Departments, the Foreign Office or the S.I.S. Finally, we show the S.I.S. our Progress Reports, though they give us nothing in return. In spite of all this, we have never been told by the C.S.S., even in the strictest confidence, exactly where his agents and organisations are, how many W/T posts he has in any given area, the sort of difficulties his people are experiencing, or even how and where he trains his agents. A veil of mystery surrounds his doings, and this has given rise, rightly or wrongly, to the supposition that much is concealed for purposes other than security. This suggestion may be completely unjustified; but unless "C" can be as frank with us as we

are/-

are with him, it is impossible to prevent it being made.

To be entirely frank, I think there is too much of what I would call the "false beard" mentality among members of the S.I.S, more especially among those who have been in the show for a very long time. Times have changed, and 'secret' activities are now the rule rather than the exception. They are pursued by all Governments on an increasingly large scale and their existence has become, in consequence, much more widely known. It does not now really matter in the least if the enemy knows who is responsible for any particular secret service or, indeed, how it is run, provided he does not know what it is doing. The idea of a deeply mysterious "Master Spy", sitting in some unknown office and directing an army of anonymous agents is as out of date as it is romantic. What is wanted is intelligent and hard working organisers who can keep their mouths shut when necessary - but who can also talk with complete frankness when necessary, that is to say to anyone in authority who wants to know the real facts.

In saying all this I would not want to suggest that S.O.E. themselves are entirely free from the 'false beard' mentality; still less that they have not, as C.D. himself admits, probably, on occasions, done things which have caused the legitimate displeasure of "C". What I do maintain is that S.O.E. has consistently put all its cards on the table in its dealings with "C", while "C" has kept nearly all his in his hand - I will not say up his sleeve! It follows, therefore, to my mind at least, that if we are to have successful liaison with "C" it must be two-way, and not one-way as is at present unfortunately the case.

Before I ap roach such constructive suggestions for remedying this state of affairs as I have to offer, I would say that

there -

(1) It might be possible for S.I.S. and S.O.E. to appoint high level liaison officers to sit in each other's buildings. This might work, supposing you got absolutely the right people who were entirely in the confidence of their respective chiefs, but at the same time it would be obviously difficult to define their respective spheres and to decide when some inter-tribal quarrel had to be referred to the one or the other.

(2) A better suggestion might be the appointment of some impartial person of high standing to act as "Conciliator" and to preside over a weekly meeting between C.S.S. and C.D. The function of this person would be to give an advisory ruling on disputes which, however, would only be binding if accepted by both parties. (I do not myself think that this person should be appointed a "Co-ordinator" whose rulings would have the force of law, since this would mean that he would, in fact, direct both departments - and for the reasons expressed above, I do not consider this a desirable suggestion.)

(3) Some person in the confidence of both S.I.S. and S.O.E. should be appointed as a sixth member of "C"'s Council. This person should have a complete knowledge of the working of "C"'s department and would also have an office in S.O.E. He would attend meetings of the S.O. Council and, of course, be shown the S.O.E. Progress Report. S.O.E. should accept his ruling on any disputes within a field which might be closely defined, though it is evident that they would have to reserve their right of appeal on any major question affecting the whole of their activities (e.g. the control of communications). Provided the right man were found for this job, I think that a good many suspicions on both sides would disappear and it would be one of the functions of the person selected to knock together the heads of subordinate S.I.S. and S.O.E. personnel who may come into conflict, and induce them to co-operate in

the/-

the general interests of the war.

All that I have said above is inspired by a desire to get a really good working co-operation between our two departments. I fully recognise that many of "C"'s personnel have done a wonderful job of work and indeed I know, from my experience of "C" while in the Foreign Office, how very good some of their work can be. I do not, for my part, resent criticism of S.O.E. by S.I.S. as such, provided only that the critics recognise the important part which S.O.E. has to play in the scheme of things, and are prepared to regard it as an equal partner and not as a sort of erring son.

(Sgd.) C. E D

319 F/134

Who is this?

CLASS C

DHV

RDB

LOCAL NR. 335

CIVED FROM CAIRO.

DESP. 2306 17.2.42

RECD. 2350 17.2.42

C.P. to C.C.

I am told he is a relation to our friend.

This is another of the usual C double cross.

A.D.H. fixed it all up with C.S.S. personally, and as per standard Khartoum Forpeet C.S.S. advisers have persuaded him to back out.

17/2/42

319 F/134

Who is this?

CLASS C

DHV

ROB

LOCAL NR. 735

CIPHER TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM CAIRO.

NO. 0021

DESP. 2306 17.2.42

RECD. 2350 17.2.42

LOCAL NO. 7[illegible]

GITHRI TOLUGUA [illegible]

NO. [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

[illegible]

FOLLOWING FOR [illegible]

PARA 1. [illegible] PRECEDENT [illegible] MECANISM [illegible]

PARA 2. [illegible] - TWAT [illegible] PROBLEM FACED BY [illegible] HOWEVER WHICH IS COMPLICATED BY LACK OF RESOURCES AND IMPRACTICABILITY OF DUPLICATING PLANT IN PART OF A TOWN ONE WHICH YOU HAVE YOUR SOVEREIGN AND CONSTITUTIONAL HARDLY CONTROL OF [illegible].

PARA 3. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL WE [illegible] ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION YOU THINK ADVISABLE.

[illegible] GROUP [illegible]

TR AT 0630 18.7.42 [illegible]

MOST SECRET.

CD/TC/944

10th February 1942.

MOST SECRET

From C.D. CD/TC/390

To C.S.S. 10th February 1942.

1. I attach herewith for your files copy of the C.S.S.'s famous letter on Communication Plans of 5th February - as also copy of my acknowledgement to him of today's date.

2. Ozanne has now joined us and is, I believe, actually in the office at the present moment and as soon as he has taken stock of his surroundings his first task will be to brief himself sufficiently to argue on the technical side at the forthcoming Conference alluded to in my letter to C.S.S.

C. D.

MOST SECRET

CD/SC/244

10th February 1942.

I should have confirmed to you before now the receipt of your C/8816 of 5th February 1942 - which, as you will remember, you handed to me personally, during our weekly conference on Friday last.

We decided that a small Conference (not exceeding three on each side) should be held to discuss your observations, and that this should take place as soon as our Chief Signals Officer had taken up his duties and was and a little time to shake down.

Lieut. Colonel Ozanne has now been posted to S.O.E. and we hope to get him during this week.

I might perhaps add that a study of your letter and our inter-departmental correspondence [illegible] of 22nd January 1942 leads me to think that your people have misunderstood the character of the [illegible] which we [illegible] term "correlation" or forecast of what our [illegible] in equipment may [illegible] scope; however, this can well stand over for our Conference.

I am glad to be able to take this opportunity of gratefully acknowledging the help which I know you invariably give me when it lies in your power.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET : PERSONAL.

C.D.

I put in a draft [illegible] desirable memorandum on the subject of the forthcoming changes in C's organisation.

[illegible] the light of what you told me on the telephone this-eve[illegible] subsequent discussion with the Minister I think that [illegible] certainly push the idea that a fourth officer should be added to the "watch" committee in order to represent the interests of M.E.W and of M.C.E.

It is true that, as M.E.W., this officer would in a sense be [illegible] the interests of that Ministry which is principally concerned with collection rather than operative department but, [illegible] ess [illegible] enable [illegible] to [illegible], of course all operations. The Minister, [illegible] gratefully [illegible] the suggestion you mentioned on the telephone and, in addition, he [illegible] to [illegible] the latter to [illegible] the suggestion in any way which seems best to [illegible].

There is another aspect to this problem. If C comes to this extent [illegible] the [illegible] for not having done better which [illegible] undoubtedly [illegible] and [illegible] for [illegible] economic [illegible] as one of the reasons why he has not collected better [illegible] point for us. We have never [illegible] to say that, if that is so, we [illegible] attach such importance to the handling of our economic [illegible] why he has consistently [illegible] true that [illegible] this question in any way [illegible] policy which is to wait until we get a favourable report from our [illegible] before [illegible] (I imagine, be Colonel Henderson) [illegible] official demand for our own communications [illegible] the desirability of our [illegible] on the lines [illegible] above [illegible] I [illegible] deal [illegible] work on this direction.

(Sgd.) C.E.O.

4th January, 19[illegible].

COPY SECRET & PERSONAL

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TO: C.D. FROM: AD/P

I have been thinking over the forthcoming changes in C's organisation about which I learnt yesterday and the possibility of which I reported to you several weeks ago and as I told you somewhat hurriedly last night I feel that there is an opportunity now presented to us to profit from the reorganisation. The details of the change are not yet known to us but rather take the line, I think, of recommendations which I put up in November 1939 when C's predecessor died. Roughly speaking, I would say that the lay-out consists of a

and for showing dividends.

It is clear that in the process of reorganisation there will be much dead wood to cut away and probably the interregnum will be rather an anxious time from the point of view of incoming information through the most secret methods, or which C. has largely relied for so long, will remain. These, however, are not pure intelligence though a pure intelligence picture can be built up from them, luckily for us. It is during the interregnum that we may be able to help by saying that although we are not an Intelligence organisation, we have intelligent persons and operators in the field whose services can be temporarily put at C's disposal.

The line, I think, that we should adopt with C. and with his future is, roughly, the following:-

(a) Offer to help as mentioned above while the house is being cleaned and afterwards if necessary and desired.

(b) Stress at the same time the fact that we are an operational organisation primarily and require no less than the Intelligence Service, good communications. In fact it can be justifiably pointed out that an operational unit requires better communications than an Intelligence unit when operations are taking place.

(c) We should endeavour to establish in the minds of all concerned the comparable idea which exists in the fighting Services of Intelligence and Operations working side by side each other, but not amalgamated, each being the handmaiden of the other, since without Intelligence operations are dangerous and without operations Intelligence is more difficult to obtain.

(d) With regard to communications I feel that with the new it is certain that there will be a change, if not in control most certainly of technique and that instead of C's communications remaining mysterious and secret as they will, so to speak, become a service common to all. The same may be in service, improved by the technical relations established by the Armed Forces, by Research Stations and so forth.

It is even more important, therefore, I feel that before we [illegible] on our separation [illegible] development in respect of communications we should have the whole matter [illegible] for time and never wished to throw our cap into the ring until one had seen how long the Augean stables of Broadway would remain uncleansed. Incidentally you may like to be reminded that it is very nearly a year ago since the Chiefs of Staff convened a special meeting with the object of finding out how best to improve C's organisation. It was at that meeting, when both the present D.N.I. and D.N.I. extolled the existing C. and said that it was unthinkable that he should be changed though they admitted that Intelligence was not coming in as it should and they pleaded for more and better communications by air, and, like myself, at that time were doubtful as to the wisdom of separating D. from C. for fear that D's activities in the search for Intelligence might compromise C's activities.

(e) I am not certain at present whether M.E.W. has any special representative on C's staff but it might be a very [illegible] move to suggest to C. that when the [illegible] starts, a combined M.E.W. and S.O.E. representative should be added to the [illegible] in the same way that the Secretary of the M.E.W. is a member of the J.I.C. This will not of course ensure a hundred per cent S.O.E. representation, but is a step towards it - so many of M.E.W. and S.O.E. activities being related. In any case, I think we should not fail to take the chance to improve our representation through some way or another and we can quite clearly interest a new [illegible] who will be more in the picture than the existing organisation which regrettably is so non-cooperative or jealous.

There are probably many other points which will occur to you and to me also but I should like to have a word with you before I see Redhurst tomorrow as I feel it is of inestimable value to keep in with him and try and work out with him not necessarily a more attractive S.O.E. picture, though that will follow, but an improved national lay out for the Secret Services which at last is being tackled with something approaching though not with full realism. Above all let us be cooperative.

MINUTE SHEET

[illegible]

[illegible]

I am in complete
agreement

[illegible]

So am I.
A revised project
should be quite over
the question.
[illegible] we might
begin with a report
by Colonel Henderson
& then have the final
conference in Cairo
room. 5.9.24.

[illegible]

MOST SECRET

From C.I.

To C.E. , 20th January 1947.
no copies made

S.I.S. and S.O.E

1. This may be a long paper - but I am writing it because I have noticed we are now reaching a stage in the association of S.I.S. and S.O.E. where the no objections letter is in regard to future relationship must be dealt with to use a hackneyed phrase on a statesmanlike basis.

2. I attach herewith a memorandum from Major C's superior officer, which very roughly represents the view held by practically all the directors - that is to say I think we all feel that the tone of this document savours of the impertinent.

3. I have however been giving very long thought for some alternative line to what I have recommended and I feel that we have recognised and accepted it as well as inevitable, namely that we are moving fast towards a crisis in our relations with S.O.E.

4. I think probably that I differ from my colleagues as to how best we ought to handle this and I shall be very grateful if you will read the paper, and if possible ask S.O. to read it, so that we may perhaps consult together on the line that we think we ought to adopt. Not only on detail matters such as Communications, but the general attitude of obstruction and deceit, which I am afraid there can be no disguising we experience every day and every week from various members of S. organisation.

5. I approach this whole matter firstly from the standpoint which I believe to be correct, namely that the star of S.O.E. is rising slowly but surely, whereas the market rotation of S.I.S. is stationary and some critics would even say that it is moving downwards. Some critics that this is a view expressed by Lord Selborne to the effect that I know and I mention it here only because from a [illegible] it carries a good deal of weight, but it is a view that have also been expressed indirectly to me from various quarters.

6. [illegible] little doubt that [illegible] directors [illegible] is on our side [illegible] Co[illegible] a [illegible] a long [illegible] worth [illegible]

7. I do not [illegible] [illegible] possible [illegible] to [illegible] attempts [illegible] C [illegible] with the various [illegible] entities, [illegible]

Belittle

[illegible]

9. [illegible] I believe that the first step [illegible] the C.S.S. [illegible] I [illegible] table [illegible] September 1940 at the [illegible] Office as [illegible] subject.

10. I firmly believe that the C.S.S. himself has never really [illegible] that the "first [illegible] of S.C., is really not [illegible] receive [illegible] of reciprocity [illegible] "state intell" [illegible]

11. [illegible]

In [illegible]

thrown on Cables and Wireless by other Government Departments who now use them in much the same way as we do, or [illegible]

(a) to render the delays quite hopeless, or

(b) that such Communications would be carried by the Cable Company's wireless, which might perhaps necessitate changing our present private cypher code;

in such circumstances it is perfectly certain that S.I.S. could not carry our ever increasing load of routine communications day by day and at a time when they would be needed more than ever.

12. I believe that we should have the backing of all Service Departments if we based our plea for separate Communications Both Secret and Main Line, on the ground that this is in the National Interest, namely that when Secret or [illegible] the more channels of Communication there are, the better it may be for Great Britain in the event of certain possibilities if not probabilities, of enemy action.

Certainly this was a view expressed to me by General Rawson, the Army Director of Signals, the other day.

13. At all costs I have come to the conclusion that we should endeavour to avoid a subsidiary, but none the less cogent, argument, so far as we personally are concerned, that the personalities involved with the direction of S.I.S. wireless are such that make day to day co-operation impossible.

14. At this juncture it becomes a most important matter for us to know what truth, if any, there may be in what I believe to be pending arrangements for a reorganisation of S.I.S., for if my information is correct (and I think you have more or less checked it and found it reasonably accurate) there is a proposal, which now only awaits Cadogan's approval

S.I.S. organisation to clear up and put on a proper basis what [illegible] describes as the "deplorable chaos" alleged to exist at present.

15. It may be that if you can get confirmation from Cadogan that this is imminent, we should await this development before inviting C.S.S. to a round table conference - and in fact, arising out of this, perhaps the best procedure would be for you to suggest to Cadogan that you would like such a conference, in which case he may volunteer to you what the projected reorganisation arrangements, if any, are in S.I.S., and when they are likely to come into force.

16. Amongst the matters which I think we ought to discuss with Cadogan and [illegible] - if and [illegible] takes place - would be my suggestion that a high Officer of S.I.S. should sit in S.O.E. offices and a high S.O.E. Officer should sit in S.I.S. offices, for whilst the Dansey liaison is working reasonably well owing to the pleasant personal relationship which he has with so many of us here, it only touches the surface of things and he is far too busy to get down to the bedrock root of this constant daily friction.

17. Returning for a moment to this eternal subject of Communications, I am inclined to think that the best way to deal with it would be to ask C.S.S. to agree to one or two Service Signal Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs examining the whole question of Communications as between S.E.A.C. and S.E.A.C. and to give their recommendations. I cannot say at all certainly whether we should be able to get a response from the Service Chiefs for this to be done; but I have reason to believe, after discussing it with AD/P, that this could be arranged.

Of course if the C.S.S. were to agree to separate without this, it is pertinent for you to ask why we require a Commission to advise us and especially if by that time we have succeeded in obtaining a Signals Officer of good standing - and to this I would reply that it is an important and probably irrevocable step and that we should benefit by such an impartial and expert examination.

18. In conclusion I assume that S.C. need not be occupied with this matter at this juncture if he and you accept my suggestion that we should endeavour to reach agreement on what I may call your and my own Chief level - but assuming that this fails and no improvement in the general situation makes itself apparent, we shall at least have to call upon his services to take the matter up upon whatever level may be necessary to ensure that the progress of S.E.A.C. is not impeded.

C. D

To. C.[illegible]

From: A/D.

AD/OR/323

[illegible]th January 1942.

I set out hereunder my comments on the draft of "S.[illegible].S. Proposals for an amended Annex II to be attached to the paper entitled 'Subversion'". I am commenting only upon those paragraphs in which the [illegible] draft differs from that dated 24.12.41 submitted [illegible] C.S.S. on the 26.12.41.

1. a) Projects

[illegible]

has added to our draft under this heading.

3. (c) Communications. (i) Main Line Communications

We could not agree to the inclusion in Annex II of the para rep. added by C.S.S., laying down that ciphers should be approved by the A.C. & C.S. department of the Foreign Office and that copies of all communications should be passed to S.I.S.

As regards the former, this is of course quite a separable question, but it is none of C.S.S's business. Its inclusion in this draft is an irrelevance. Similarly, while we do in fact pass some of the communications received from our agents in our own cipher to [illegible], this is a matter of [illegible] and is not a subject which can be dealt with by C.S.S.

over/...

0/2

To: C.[illegible]

From: A/[illegible]

AD/OR/323

14th January, 1942.

I set out hereunder my comments on the draft of "U.S. Proposals for an amended Annex II to be attached to the paper entitled 'Subversion'". I am confining these only upon that one paragraph as to which the draft differs from that dated 24.12.41 submitted by the C.S.S. on the 26.12.41.

1. (a) Projects

I do not think we could possibly accept the proposal to create, expressly to replace the defunct Projects Board, a fortnightly meeting to discuss future plans of S.O.E. This is wrong in principle as it would clearly imply that the C.S. had some sort of right to know everything that S.O.E. was doing and, if desired, to raise objections to it. It would not work in practice

a) because there would be quite a number of things which we would not want to talk about, and

b) it would certainly result in delays and obstructions to practically all our projects.

The whole proposal would, in effect, mean reversion to the position under the old "[illegible]" Board which, it will be remembered, was readily found unworkable.

I think we might well agree to some form of liaison with C as regards our projects, but it certainly should not form part of Annex II but should be some machinery set up by mutual agreement which could be modified or abolished at any time according to circumstances

2. (b) Transport

I see no objection to the paragraph which C.S.S. has added to our draft under this heading.

3. (c) Communications. (i) Main Line Communications

We could not agree to the inclusion in Annex II of the paragraph added by C.S.S., laying down that ciphers should be approved by the [illegible] & C.S. Department of the Foreign Office and that copies of all communications should be passed to C.S.

As regards the former, this is of course quite a reasonable suggestion, but it is none of C.S.S's business and its inclusion in this draft is an attempt encroachment. Similarly, while we do in fact pass some of the communications received and transmitted in our ciphers to C.S., this is an act of courtesy on our part and is not a right which can be claimed by C.S.

over/...

4 (c) Communications ii) Operational Control

The proposals set out in these paragraphs would amount in practice to some thing rather worse than the status quo, with which, of course, we are already completely dissatisfied and are, in my view, so entirely unacceptable as not even to provide any basis for discussion.

I recommend that C.S.S. should be told this bluntly. It would, in my opinion, be disastrous for us to waver in the slightest from our determination to secure control of our own communications.

C.I.

M. 08 170

19.1.43.

To C

From M

---

1 I have read the attached draft Annex 2

The general tone of the whole Annex is that we are a junior partner of the S.I.S. and it is therefore in its present form quite unacceptable. The root of the matter seems to be that because the old "Section" was a small part of the S.I.S. its successor is still considered to be in some way under the general authority of the S.I.S. The real basis now is that we are in fact an equal partner with S.I.S., although this, I admit, is not yet generally realised or appreciated.

2. I do not know who drafted this paper, but obviously it is someone who is completely ignorant of our activities, there are a mass of petty restrictions and pompous asses' notes for our behaviour which if they were written seriously and considered seriously by are an insult in themselves.

3 A few general words. The whole basis of the attitude which 'C' openly adopts (though honestly cannot believe) is that our subversive activities may interfere with the collection of information. But we all aware that the information which we get from our direct agents in foreign countries represents what I would call an almost negligible proportion of the total information which we receive from wireless intercepts (Fifth Arm of Battle from the Sea and S.O.E.), from the underground, etc. and extracts from the reports above those actually employed by the Poles and the Czechs. In France and in Holland, in Denmark and in Norway we know that we have very few men who are sending any information. I cannot see therefore how, in actual reality, subversive operations can possibly seriously affect "information". Therefore I hold that there is no solid foundation for this reiteration that subversive activities adversely affect intelligence. Nowhere does 'C' claim that the C.C.O.'s operations should also be co-ordinated with his alleged intelligence service, yet the raid on Vaagso is much more likely than any of our efforts to prejudice his service, if it exists.

4 Both on our side, however, and on that of S.I.S individual 'gaffes' will be committed which will affect each of us adversely and these we must guard against as best we can, e.g. Belgium (S.I.S. at fault), Denmark (S.I.S.), Stockholm (S.O.E.), West Africa (S.I.S.)

5 As regards detailed criticisms of the text and substance, I have the following

(a) Projects: I could not feel more strongly the danger of the resumption of any board of this nature. It serves no useful purpose as most of what would transpire would be Greek to the S.I.S., but would give them just the opportunity they require for throwing spanners in the works. We must not as well ourselves claim the necessity of [illegible] of this nature to discuss 'C's [illegible], lest we [illegible] him to render a weekly progress [illegible] against our weekly Progress Report going to 'C' unless we receive a quid pro quo. I do not remember a single case in which a project of ours directed

against

[illegible] far the enemy has ever been quite [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

MOST SECRET

~~NOTES FOR WAR DIARY~~

Mr. Churchill

SIS proposals for amended Annex

I have gone thro' this most carefully a number of times and my personal view is that it is utterly unacceptable. Even as a basis for discussion

It has an undertone of condescending patronage bordering on the impertinent

The two main proposals that (a) Communications Branches be unified (i.e. Secret Comms) under the Control of Junior Party and (b) the revival of a sort of Projects Board are both quite outside any scheme contemplated i.e. from my point of view

A D -

[illegible] January 1942.

19.

B OF THE BOARD
[illegible]

MOST SECRET

2 -

~~NOTES FOR WAR DIARY~~

I am circulating a copy of the proposals to all Members of the Board, - and have asked them to be ready to give their first impressions to you as to material Evening meeting.

I have not broadcast my own views yet.

[illegible]

18/1/42

[illegible] to [illegible] 7 [illegible] "A" [illegible] [illegible] "[illegible]"

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible] or [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] so far [illegible].

CD/M/074 17th January 1942.

[illegible]

"O: [illegible]

1. Attached are draft proposals sent to [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] the so-called "A[illegible] ex[illegible]" of September 1940, setting out "Local Rules" as between [illegible] and [illegible].

2. [illegible] preliminary discussion [illegible] the directors' [illegible] on [illegible] January [illegible] thereafter [illegible] if [illegible] we can [illegible] or in respect of [illegible] proposed arrangements.

3. I [illegible] preliminary [illegible] at [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

Treasury through the medium of S.T.S. For this purpose

B.E.E., whose financial

each month with an estimate

during the then current month

receipts and expenditure, as

MOST SECRET.

DRAFT OF S.I.S. [illegible] FOR AN ARMOURED

ANNEX II TO BE ATTACHED TO THE PAPER

ENTITLED 'SUBVERSION'

January, 1942.

S.I.S. and S.O.E. have agreed as follows:-

1. S.O.E. is a separate, secret organisation under the control of Dr. Dalton. The function of this organisation is the promotion of Subversion and the carrying on of subversive activities in all parts of the world outside this country. For the general purposes of administration and discipline the S.O.E. organisation comes under Dr. Dalton and not under the Foreign Secretary. The function of S.I.S., who operate under the control of the Foreign Secretary, is the collection, collation and distribution of secret information and intelligence.

11. At the same time S.O.E. and S.I.S. are intimately associated one with the other, and to function efficiently there must be friendly co-operation between both parties concerned. There are several respects in which the interests of S.I.S. and S.O.E. must clash. In order to obviate such clashes and to preserve harmony, arrangements have been agreed in terms of the various headings which follow.

(a) Projects.

A project may quite possibly be good for purposes of Subversion, but bad for purposes of Intelligence. S.I.S. is in a position to know of the general nature of S.O.E. projects as a result of the direct liaison between the various sections of the two organisations, but to replace the defunct project board there should be a fortnightly meeting of not more than three senior officers

from either organisation to discuss future plans in addition to the rendering by S.O. , of the weekly progress report. In the event of a conflict of interest arising the issue will, if possible, be settled by agreement between the two organisations; if C.S.S. and C.O. are unable to reach such an agreement the question must be referred to higher authority. If such a conflict arises between representatives abroad, in circumstances in which it would not be convenient for the issue to be referred home, the question may be referred to the appropriate local authority, such as the senior representative of H.M. Government in neutral countries, the Governor or Governor-General of Dominions and Colonies, the Commander-in-Chief or resident Cabinet Minister in those areas which are part of the war zone. The S.I.S. and S.O.E. representatives, however, would still reserve the right to refer any question of principle to London.

(Note: Foreign Office (Balsc) telegram No of the 6th January, 1942, to Ambassadors and Ministers in South America, is particularly relevant to the above, particularly paragraph 6.).

(b) Transport.

A special flight and a special fleet have been created to meet the joint requirements of S.I.S. and S.O.E. in the matter of air and sea transport. If there is a clash of interests regarding the use of these facilities, which it is impossible to solve by friendly agreement, the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority.

Should the clash of interests be entirely one of Priority for use of these facilities, the matter should be referred to the Chiefs of the Staff Committee who alone can decide on which requirement is most urgent i.e. intelligence or subversion.

(c) Communications.

(i) Main Line Communications.

The original arrangement, by which S.I.S. affords to S.O.E. such facilities for the use of S.I.S. ciphers and communications as the requirements of security of S.I.S. permit, continues to operate, but it is agreed that S.O.E. shall, whenever it is found convenient, use their own ciphers for communications which will be transmitted between their representatives abroad to their headquarters and between the offices of their representatives abroad by approved commercial cable or wireless services instead of by S.I.S. main-line stations. (The word "representatives" does not include secret agents in neutral or occupied territories).

Ciphers should be approved by the G.C. & C.S. department of the Foreign Office, and copies of all communications will continue to be passed to S.I.S.

No S.I.S. symbols must be used by S.O.E.

(ii) Operational Communications.

In view of the grave hazards to security which may arise from two organisations endeavouring to carry out separately Secret Operational Communications, and in view of the acute shortage of skilled man power, materials and facilities, it is agreed that all projects involving the use of W.T in any form should be co-ordinated under one control responsible jointly

for the requirements of S.I.S. and S.O.E.

It is agreed that S.O.E. should continue to conduct the recruitment and training of agents in the use of W/T for their special requirements, but that in every other respect the operational use of W/T and the development and production of W/T equipment should be pooled under the unified control of the Controller, Special Communications.

Mid-East, West and East Africa have already been agreed on as areas where S.O.E. may establish their own transmitting and receiving stations, but their responsibilities in these particular areas should also be regarded as within the broad limits of the general rules set out in the two preceding paragraphs.

(d) Spheres of Interest.

These have already been defined in paragraph 1.

It follows that if S.O.E.'s agents collect intelligence other than that on specifically S.O.E. affairs, it must be passed on to S.I.S. before being circulated anywhere, even within the S.O.E. organisation itself. Conversely, if any of S.I.S.'s men is in a position to perform or to recommend some act of subversion, S.I.S. will only take action after a specific request by S.O.E.

(e) Recruitment of Agents.

S.O.E. shall recruit its own agents, but it is agreed:-

(i) That before any person is taken on by S.O.E. in London he will be put through "the cards";

(ii) That before anyone is taken on by an S.O.E. representative abroad the name will be submitted to the local S.I.S. representative to ensure that such person is not already employed by S.I.S. and where desired to obtain from S.I.S., S.O.E. any dossier which the may have about him.

(f) Finance.

Until such time as the Treasury or other higher authority otherwise directs, S.O.E. will continue to draw its funds from the

Treasury through the medium of D.L.F. For this purpose S.G.K., whose financial month ends on the 20th of each month, will furnish D.L.F. on or before the last day of each month with an estimate of its cash requirements during the then current month and also a summary of its receipts and expenditure, detailing the various Treasury sanctions and Grants, for the previous month.

[illegible]

[illegible]

From [illegible] GI/ [illegible]/206

To C.S.O. 7th January 1944.
Copy to Board of
Directors.

[illegible]

1. I attach [illegible] copy of a letter from C.S.O. [illegible] initially received at [illegible].

[illegible] I [illegible] letter [illegible] I will [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] 3. [illegible] views on [illegible]

4. [illegible] C.S.O. [illegible] observation.

5. [illegible] is possession [illegible]

6. [illegible] "[illegible]" and approval.

I cannot [illegible] two [illegible] [illegible] practical [illegible] [illegible]

7. [illegible] [illegible]

'clar[illegible]

clarification of routine details again between the two [illegible] this [illegible] could be brought up to date is already in his [illegible] purpose, if any, of our proposed new [illegible] itself would be [illegible] the [illegible] from the [illegible] has already [illegible] are [illegible].

2. [illegible] of policy and the [illegible] between the [illegible]

3. [illegible] routine [illegible] will [illegible] to [illegible] independent.

W. D.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Secret organisations by their very nature lie[illegible] [illegible] the offices of the principal Services who are naturally aware of many of their activities. [illegible] if [illegible] exposed, leads [illegible] to hostility. [illegible] secrecy between secret organisations leads to a similar state of conditions. [illegible] is avoided but [illegible] replaced by only a conventional degree of mutual confidence.

1. The principal secret organisations in the Middle East are [illegible] and S. The correspondent to its secret analysations and its definite strategic rôle is far more powerful and widespread. The latter, partly by its intelligence rôle and its relative continuity, [illegible] is far less known.

2. Personal relations between the principals are cordial and between rank and file perfectly correct. Yet there are numerous occasions where [illegible] officials seem completely ignorant [illegible] other organisation about the facts of any particular case. Difficulties could have been avoided and operations efficiently increased.

3. The Services are fully conscious of this, and on several occasions have emphasised in most definite terms the urgent need for [illegible] and confidence of these Services [illegible] forthcoming.

4. Since S.O.E. [illegible] under [illegible] outlined above [illegible] brought into [illegible] perspective [illegible] examples of [illegible] both organisations having received contradictory information or orders have come to light. There has been a lack of [illegible] between the separate sections of at least one organisation. One section has been instructed to delay assistance to the other [illegible] has never been given [illegible]. In [illegible] of the [illegible] inefficiency and over-centralisation [illegible] prior [illegible] of the [illegible] office.

5. It has become the habit in certain quarters to say that because [illegible] is charged with operations and S.I.S. with Intelligence it would be unreasonable to amalgamate them. While this argument may have some weight it if it relates only to branches in the field, the argument loses its validity rapidly if an amalgamation of the whole organisation is contemplated. The difficulty of serving two masters is thereby obviated and there is the close analogy of all the other Services where Operations and Intelligence are co-ordinated under senior commanders.

6. The advantages of such amalgamation would be shown :-

(a) in the increase of confidence of the Services

(b) in the improved co-ordination between the two organisations

(c) in the economy of their staff and equipment which should allow a sufficient increase to make their scope appropriate to the required war effort

(d) finally, in the fact that the long-term decision to keep secret activities as a part of our post war defence scheme can far more readily be achieved if amalgamation takes place now, and one and not two, organisations have to justify a permanent existence.

In conclusion, the two organisations are already become increasingly connected, whether in the provision of their joint and stations, the choice of their officers and agents or the provision of their intelligence, the strong majority of which [illegible] comes from S.O.E. In a [illegible]-scale results are to be achieved amalgamation must take place at least.



From C.D. CD/Ot/353

To A.D. 3rd January 1942

Copy up C.E.O., and all Members of the Board of Directors.

A.D.

~~A.B.~~

S.T.S. and S.L.

1. My yesterday's meeting with C.S.S. was transferred to the A.C.S.S. as the former had important meetings elsewhere.

2. The A.C.S.S. asked me to try and clarify his mind on a number of matters, including West Africa, and what we will now allude to as the Proposed Amended Annex which was discussed before Christmas by C.E.O., C.S.S. and A.D.

3. I took the A.C.S.S. right away through the West African affair document by document and point by point and got his mind, I think, quite clear on it; and incidentally got his agreement to D/CD's proposed letter from the Colonial Office to Bourdillon, which should settle this matter. (Copy attached for ready reference).

4. It was arranged between us that, with the A.C.S.S.'s mind duly clarified he should later in the evening talk the whole matter over with C.S.S. and let me know the result.

5. The result, so far as I can gather from a long telephone conversation which I have this morning had with A.C.S.S., is that D/CD's proposed letter from the Colonial Office to Bourdillon is accepted by C.S.S. in its entirety; with the exception that he cannot accept the allusion to the Amended Annex to be dated December 1941 or January 1942, as there are several points in this with which he is in disagreement.

6. I gather that his account of the interview between himself C.E.O. and A.D. is that they discussed very generally the proposal that the September 1940 Annex required alteration, but that the whole matter was left that A.D. should send him a draft of what he thought would meet the case. (Incidentally this draft was handed to him by me over nine days ago, but he did not study it until last night when he discussed it with the A.C.S.S.

7. Despite the fact that I think I have got the A.C.S.S.'s mind clear - it still appears from the latter's conversation with me over the telephone this morning that the C.S.S. still considers the September 1940 Annex to be an integral part of the Cabinet Charter!

8. I have endeavoured to explain this both to C.S.S. and A.C.S.S. ad nauseam, but they have got it all mixed up by reason of the fact that this so-called Annex is contained in the "Print" of the Paper on Subversion written by C.E.O. of which the C.S.S. has a copy

9. Coming back, however, to West Africa - in respect of which we are being pressed by the D.M.I and the Colonial Office to get this incident settled it is obviously the right moment to consider as soon as may be what points in the Amended Annex, as between S.I.S and S.O.E., the C.S.S. will not agree to, and I have therefore left it with the A.C.S.S. that as soon as C.E.O. returns a meeting should be laid on according to his convenience with C.S.S , and whoever else had better attend in order that this document may be, if possible, agreed.

10. I have no doubts in my own mind that the points with which C.S.S. will not agree are the inevitable "communications" points.

11. As the original talk on this matter took place between C.S.S , C.E.O. and A.D., I suggest that it had better be kept to these three (subject of course always to the agreement of C.E.O.,) and will A.D. therefore get into touch with C.E.O , as soon as the latter has made some inroad on his papers, and arrange for the earliest possible re-convene with C.S.S. at which I have strongly suggested to A.C.S.S. that he should be present

12 It is clear that this Amended Annex is important from every point of view i.e., West Africa, South America, and the general conduct of associations between S.I.S and S.O.E., not only in the U.K. but elsewhere.

C. D.

[illegible] ADDED ANNEX II TO [illegible] ATTACHED TO THE [illegible]

[illegible]

E.I.D. and I.C.[illegible] have agreed as follows:

1. [illegible] is a separate, secret [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible]

or [illegible] also from the [illegible] really [illegible] which is run by C.I.D.[illegible]. In the event of a conflict of interest arising, the issue will, if possible, be settled by a [illegible] between [illegible] organisations, but if C.I.D. and C.[illegible] are unable to reach such an agreement the question must be referred to higher authority.

[illegible] A [illegible] ANNEX II TO [illegible] ATTA[illegible] TO THE [illegible]

[illegible]

S.I.S. and S.O.E. are agreed as follows:

1. S.O.E. is a separate, secret organisation under the [illegible] Minister. The function of this organisation is the promotion of Subversion and the carrying on of subversive activities in all parts of the world outside this country, for the general purposes of administration [illegible] organisation comes under Dr. Dalton and not under the Foreign Secretary. The function of S.I.S., which operates under the control of the Foreign Secretary, is the collection, collation and distribution of secret information and intelligence.

2. At the same time, S.O.E. is intimately associated with S.I.S. both on historical and on practical grounds, and it is [illegible] to the function of S.O.E., it must be [illegible] from the organisation of S.I.S. There are several respects in which the interests of S.I.S. and S.O.E. may clash, and the following arrangements have been agreed upon in order to preserve harmony:

(a) Projects

A project may quite possibly be good for purposes of Subversion, but bad for purposes of Intelligence. S.O.E. is in a position to know of the general nature of S.I.S. projects as a result of the direct liaison between the various sections of the two organisations and also from the [illegible] monthly progress report which is sent by S.I.S. In the event of a conflict of interest arising, the issue will, if possible, be settled by agreement between the two organisations, but if S.I.S. and S.O.E. are unable to reach such an agreement the question must be referred to higher authority.

arises between representatives abroad, in circumstances in [illegible] convenient for the case to be referred [illegible], two questions should be [illegible] to local authority, such as [illegible] under the S.[illegible] or [illegible] in those areas which are [illegible].

(b) [illegible]

A special flight and a special fleet have been created to meet the joint requirements of S.I.S. and [illegible] in the matter of [illegible] sea transport. If there is a class of [illegible] arising the use of these facilities, which it is impossible to solve by [illegible], [illegible] must be submitted to [illegible] authority.

(c) [illegible]

The original arrangement, by [illegible], affords to S.I.S. such facilities for the use of S.I.S. [illegible] and communications as the requirements of security of S.I.S. permit, continues to operate, but subject to two major modifications:

(i) S.I.S. have agreed that S.O.E. shall, whenever it is found convenient, use their own ciphers for communications which will be transmitted between their representatives abroad to their headquarters and between the officers of their representatives abroad by commercial cable or wireless instead of [illegible] S.I.S. [illegible] stations.

(ii) S.I.S. have agreed that, in principle, S.O.E. shall have the right to create their own [illegible] for [illegible] between these stations and S.O.E. operational sets in the hands of their agents. These

stations will be under the administrative control of [illegible] alone, but the usual arrangements covering signal plans, etc., will have to be concerted with the local S.I.S. [illegible], the latter [illegible] organ, these stations will not be used as relaying stations for communication with Great Britain. Each particular case in which S.I.S. wish to get to one of these stations, will be discussed by them with S.I.S.

In so far as S.I.S. may at times use S.O.E. facilities, it is agreed that if, for any reason, a telegram submitted by S.I.S. for transmission by S.O.E. be rejected by the latter, S.I.S. will be informed and will [illegible] to make other arrangements.

( ) Sp[illegible] In[illegible]t

[illegible] 1. It follows that, if [illegible] collect intelligence other than that [illegible] all [illegible] affairs, it must be [illegible] circulated [illegible] in the S.O.E. organisation itself. Conversely, if any of S.I.S's [illegible] is in a position to perform or to [illegible] some act of sabotage, S.I.S. will [illegible] before taking any action.

(v) Management of Agents

S.O.E. shall [illegible] it is agreed:

(i) that before any person is [illegible] by S.O.E. in London, [illegible] will be put [illegible] this claim;

(ii) that before a [illegible] is taken [illegible] representative [illegible], the name will be submitted to the local S.I.S. representative to the local S.O.E. representative to ensure that such person is not already employed by S.I.S. and to obtain from S.I.S. any caveat which they may have about him.

(f) Finance

[illegible] -000- -3-

[illegible]

236

SC/3070/45.

D.C.D.

Please see the attached copy of a letter from "C" to Dawe, of the Colonial Office. This is presumably the result of the A.C.S.S.'s suggestion with which we agreed in principle the other day.

I do not think, however, that the proposals contained in "C's" letter quite meet the case. What we want to do, surely, is to quote the crucial paragraphs in our own "Charter", that is to say, the Cabinet document of July 1940, and then to say that subsequently, an agreement was come to with "C" in October 1940 which still regulates the basis of our relations with "C's" organisation, although it has to a certain extent been modified in practice (we might here say how it has been modified and notably, I think, in regard to the establishment of our own communications.

In any case, I think we want to get some revised draft out, and perhaps we could discuss the whole question at the Meeting of Directors on Monday next.

13th December, 1941.

236 (P)

236

F134

raison of SOE rep
with Chinese
in the America -

See [illegible]

236

Dear [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] the questi[illegible]
all [illegible] of a [illegible]

I believe it is particularly desirable that the level of the committee should be the Country Sections themselves and that they should make recommendations to those above rather than that the committee should be on a higher level of beings who must of necessity not be so conversant with the daily problems.

In our case the findings of the committee would be reported to Spurber and Sub Inc.

[illegible] led, if you are in a [illegible] would inform your people of [illegible] that the so called committee [illegible] the least possible delay as there seem [illegible] at most numerous problems that should be [illegible] at the earliest possible moment.

[illegible] very sincerely,

236 (25)

CD to CEO 0125

SY in Barnum
SWE

The information was apparently asked for by [illegible] - on the grounds that it came yesterday and bothers two

CD [illegible] and automatically make copies of the telephone [illegible] the ACEC

[illegible]

CD
[illegible]

intelligence
telegrams of this
nature, the
situation is
particularly
complicated in
Stockholm just
at present (for
reasons of
which you are
aware – but
we will put
it on a better
basis after the
arrival of
Pellacani

Ellis

236

3+

[illegible]

TO ACS ONLY.

CIPHER TELEGRAM [illegible]

[illegible]

4) [illegible] STATE CO[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] HANDS B[illegible] [illegible]

1 [illegible]

5) AT 14 HOURS T[illegible] [illegible] AT [illegible]

STAN[illegible] CONTRACT, JACOBSE[illegible] AND [illegible] JAERBE[illegible]

EXPRESSED WISHES TO SIGN PACT.

3 +

+ + . E1.

TO AC[illegible] ONLY.

[illegible] PRIE TELEGRAM [illegible]

NO. 47[illegible].

— — [illegible]

FOLLOWING FOR [illegible]

MY TELEGRAM NO. [illegible]

FOLLOWING IS APPL[illegible]

1) [illegible] DANESBURY [illegible] THE [illegible]

S C A N D I N A V I A N [illegible] IN THAT [illegible]

OF DENMARK TO SIGN P A C T [illegible]

BEFORE 25TH NOVEMBER.

2) DURING FOR DAY NOVEMBER [illegible]

? AMONG CERTAIN [illegible]

3) ON A VIEW [illegible] AT [illegible] THE [illegible]

AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE [illegible] MEETING [illegible]

STATE COUNCIL WAS [illegible]

SINCE [illegible]

A M [illegible] E N B O R G PAID [illegible]

WHICH [illegible] PRESSED [illegible]

ACTUALLY SAID HE WOULD [illegible]

RESIGN IF GERMANY WAS [illegible]

4) DUR[illegible] THE STATE COUNCIL [illegible]

GERMAN DEMANDS B T S C A N D I N A V I A N [illegible]

IN FAVOUR.

5) AT 14 HOURS THERE WAS ANOTHER CABINET MEETING AT [illegible]

S T A N D I N G CONTRACT, J A C O B S E N AND [illegible] J A E R G E R O L

EXPRESSED WISHES TO SIGN P A C T.

6) AT 4A HOURS THERE WAS A MEETING OF NINE MAN COMMITTEE WHICH ALSO AGREED THAT GERMAN DEMANDS MUST BE REJECTED.

7) DURING THE AFTERNOON THERE WERE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT CIRCLES AND QUESTION OF P R O T O C O L TO PACT WAS DISCUSSED.

8A DURING THE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 22ND GERMAN MINISTER RECEIVED INFORMATION IN GENERAL POSITION AND REPORTED TO BERLIN WHO TELEPHONED HIM BETWEEN THREE AND A TWO ON MORNING OF NOVEMBER AND GAVE HIM LAST ULTIMATUM TO DANISH GOVERNMENT.

9) ULTIMATUM ANNOUNCING GERMANY'S D E N U N C I A T I O N OF TREATY 9TH APRIL AND STATED IF DENMARK DID NOT SIGN P A C T SHE WOULD BE REGARDED AS A BELLIGERANT POWER FIGHTING GERMANY, WITH INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES. IF C OP NUTO ORDERED DENMARK SIGNS. GERMANY WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD TREATY 9TH APRIL AS BEING IN FORCE.

10) DANISH GOVERNMENT CAPITULATING. PARLIAMENT GATHERING AT 2130 HOURS TO GROUP MEETINGS.

11) DURING THE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 23RD THERE WAS AGAIN CABINET MEETING AT WHICH IT WAS AGREED TO ACCEPT GERMAN DEMANDS. STATE COUNCIL WAS CALLED FOR 23 HOURS THAT NIGHT WHEN IT WAS DECIDED TO SIGN.

12) THE GROUP 2 MEETING OF PARLIAMENT WHICH COLLECTED AT 2130 HOURS HAD CASE LAID BEFORE THEM.

13) XXXXXXX 1 ON MORNING NOV. 24TH P S C A V E N I U S FLIES TO BERLIN TO SIGN TREATY.

SEE PAGE 3

STRCTLY PERSONAL.

M/XX/1110.

11/10/41.

To: C.D.

From: M.

Re attached:
note, is C's head man in charge of all communications with agents and also monitoring of training. Why he wrote this note I do not know but apparently no-one in C's organisation is aware that he did [illegible] who wrote this

PAGE 3.

14) TREATY WILL NOT BE RATIFIED BY PARLIAMENT THIS IS NOT NECESSARY SINCE PARA 19 OF CONSTITUTION ONLY DEMANDS RATIFICATION TREATIES WHICH AFFECT COUNTRY'S I N T E G R I TY.

15) PUBLICATION OF FACT IN BRITISH B.B.C. BROADCAST THIS EVENING HAS MADE EXCELLENT IMPRESSION AMONG DANES HERE.

16) PLEASE CONTINUE PUBLISH FACTS BY ALL POSSIBLE CHANNELS FOR NEXT FEW DAYS.

STRCTLY PERSONAL.

M/XX/1110.

11/10/41.

To: C.D.

From: M.

Re attached: who wrote this note, is C's head man in charge of all communications with agents and also monitoring of training. Why he wrote this note I do not know but apparently no-one in C's organisation is aware that he did write it and it should be kept from them.

himself is an unpleasant type and I have told Squadron-Leader LONG to-day that I do not like him hanging round our school.

I am afraid that there is a lot of chi-chi going on about training within C's organisation and that they are trying to drag us into the melee, but if we remain honest we can, I think, avoid any trouble.

Squadron-Leader LONG has already twice made overtures to Captain KAPLOWITCH either to join C or to slow down our training, which Kay immediately refused, and to-day Squadron-Leader LONG suggested to me that Kay was not very much good and that he had better men whom, if I liked, he could give me as a replacement. I told him that I was perfectly satisfied with Kay. There is no need for any action at the moment and I am keeping my eyes open.

ENCL.

SECRET

PERSONAL & SECRET.

11th September, 1941.

My dear Jebb,

Many thanks for your letter O/S740/25 of the 9th inst. I am glad you found the reports of interest.

Dalthrop telephoned us about the matter you have mentioned and it was arranged that the B.O.S. Cairo representative should get into touch with our people there.

Yours ever,

C D

Gladwyn Jebb Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
W.1.